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論　説
Decline of Corporate Reputation Caused by Violation
of Corporate Governance and Compliance
Michiham Sakurai
Intro duc也on
Around 20 to 30 years ago, me "risk" meant a so-called countⅣ risk, which
arises when丘rms conduct overseas investment or operate in the overseas mar-
ket. Local production involves a number of reputation risks, such as bribery to
local high-ranking ofBcers, local contents relating tothe procurement of materi-
als,and suspicion of sexualharassment due to cultural difference. Japanese
fim1S facing such lawsuit or suffer damage have recently decreased, paruy due
to learning effect. Recently, however, Japanese丘rmswithoverseas operations
are now required to respond to new bTpeS Of risks, such as demands by NGOs,
press, pressure groups for local employment, humanrights and environmental
Issues.
From a domestic standpoint, more focus has been placed on issues such as
corporate govemance , Compliance , employment , environmental destmction ,
product safebr, and workplace safety. As compared with overseas cases, such
domestic issues have come to cause a more signi丘cant decline in corporate
reputa也on andgive greater丘nancial loss to the丘rm that responds wrongly to
the issues.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss decline of corporate reputation due to
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Violation of corporate governance and compliance which leads Sarbanes - 0Xley
Act (2002, United States) and Standard of Assessment and Audit of Internal Con-
trols over Financial Reports (2005, Japan). This paper focuses on the decline of
reputation on Daiwa Bank, Sumitomo Corporation and Seibu Railway Co., ud.
in comparison with Enron which lead Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. and above
mentioned standard in Japan. Scandals described in this paper lead to a new
type of internalcontrol systems of each country.
1. Risk Management of Corporate Reputation
ln many cases, risk management in Japan has been discussed mainly from the
perspective of relationship with丘nancial risks. ln recent years, however, risk
management includes processes, activities, and systems to monitor the areas
where problems may be developed even in daily activities. As a result, the re-
cent area of risk management includes corporate governance, Compliance, envi-
ronmental conservation, product safety, and employee health and safety.
1. Risk Management and Reputation Management
Risk management has been becoming indispensable to better management in
the modern global business world. Reputation management will be ultimately
the same as risk management as Fombrun and Van Riel l2004] argues. Reputa-
tion management has become a great signiflCanCe in doing business because of
the following reasons.
First, the focus of risk management has been shifted to not only statistical in-
vestment risk issues focusing on丘nance, but also the handling of risks related
to corporate governance, Compliance , and strategic appropriateness [Neef,
2003]. They are closely related wi仙corporate reputation. Therefore, reputation
management today has a larger managerial signi丘cance than in the past. Sec-
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ond, as the focus of risks is shifted to not only financial risks but also strategic
and operational risks, there has been an increasing need for conducting the
risk management in connection wi仙actual events of the丘rm. For managing
reputation risks, it became necessary for the firm to make decisions by ration-
ally evaluating stakeholder responses. Third, risks cannot be always treated as
something wrong. Because corporate reputation is generated by daily actions of
management and employees, it is hard to completely avoid risks even if firms
tried to. The important thing is to face and appropriately manage risks, not to
avoid them.
2. Major Areas of Reputation Risk
Firms are facing a number or risks in their daily business activities that may
result in the decline in corporate reputation. Reputation risks can be catego-
rized into仙e followlng three groups.
First, the most crucial areas where丘rms may take risks are corporate govern-
ance and compliance. However, we should noticethat there is an essential dif-
ference between corporate governance and compliance ; while corporate gov-
ernance is affected by top management including CEO, compliance is mainly af-
fected by not only management but also each employee. Compliance is closely
related with ethics and integrity.
Second, there are recently a number of strategic risks covering technology and
marketing. As multi-national丘rms are dominating the global market and com-
petition among companies toward technology innovation is intensi丘ed, there
have been increasing strategic risks related to technology and marketing. The
areas of these risks include products and seⅣices, environmental issues, labor
issues in multi-national firms, M&A and overseas business risks.
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仙ird, a number of risks that may result in the decline in corporate reputation
would occur even if there were no problems in corporate governance and com-
pliance. For example, there was the case where afirm's stock price has sharply
dropped because of the newspaper report that mentioned about the factthat
data containing a number of its customers'personal information was left on仇e
rack of a JR (Japan Railway) train and lost.
Reputation risk very frequently arises from corporate governance, Compliance,
product safety and PL, employment and environmental issues in Japanese com-
panies, but most controversial reputation issue is closely related with corporate
governance and compliance. Both cannot be separated with each other, so we
will discuss decline of corporate reputation due to neglect or violation of corpo-
rate governance and compliance.
2. Corporate Govemance and Compliance
mere have been quite a few accounting related scandals and illegal actions of
executives and employees about huge losses produced overseas by Japanese
companies since the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991. me Daiwa Bank
huge loss case and the Sumitomo Corporation copper trading case were the
large corporate governance and compliance-related issues commi仕ed by execu-
tives and employees. Seibu Railway case shows us traditional type of scandal
made by CEO. What were the huge losses at Daiwa Bank New York Branch
and Sumitomo Corporation?
1. Huge loss at Daiwa Bank NewYork Branch
The Daiwa Bank New York Branch case came to the surface in 1995. This case
was caused by bank employee A of the New York Branch who had issued a
large amount of U.S. TreasuⅣ without prlOr COnSent Of the bank for ll years,
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and the loss was expandedl. Thefinal loss reached 1. 1 billion dollars (113. 3 bill
lion yen). Middle management A sold customers'and the bank's securities with-
out permission in order to make up for the loss. No member of the manage一
ment had noticed me fact until the same employee A sent a le仕er of confession
to the President B of the Daiwa Bank at the time.
According to a report by the Asahi newspaper l1996/2/29] , the same A started
off-book transactions in 1984.When there was an inspection by the New York
Federal Bank in 1992, the loss was camou且aged throughthe disguised separa-
tion of the uS. Treasury Sales Department and SecurityStorage Department of
the New York Branch. In 1993, Daiwa Bank reported to the New York Federal
Bank that there was the imitative deception. The U.S. trust subsidiaⅣ com-
pleted the loss disposition in 1994 by using a separate company. Then, as de-
scribed above, the le仕er of confession was sent血･om the same A to the Presi-
dent B on July24, 1995.
According to Mizuno [1996] who has thoroughly studied the Daiwa Bank case,
Daiwa Bank and its New YoI･k Branch tl-ied to cover up the case after the fact
was confirmed. In this case, it has been also exposed that Daiwa Bank told a
lie to the Federal ReseⅣe Board (FRB) and the New York State Banking Bu-
reau about its illegal activities at the time of their inspections. It was the "case
where Ministry of Finance (at the time : author's note) , which received a report
from Daiwa Bank, neglected to report the fact to the U.S. authorityand told a
lie arranged beforehand with the Daiwa Bank regarding the date when the re-
port was received from Daiwa Bank."
1 The loss at Daiwa Bank Trust, the U.S. subsidiary of Daiwa Bank, was exempted
from the examination in this paper.
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Daiwa Bank was expelled血･om the U.S. and was ordered to pay 35. 8 billion
yen (around 281 million dollars). In terms of the internal inspection conducted at
Daiwa Bank, the bank admitted the responsibility of not having been able to
prevent the crime because of the inappropriate way of intemal audit con-
ducted by the vice president C. Regarding the delay of reporting to the U.S. fL
nancial authorityafter the crime was discovered, Ministry of Finance (now, Fi-
nancial Securities Agency) was criticized about the way to execute financial ad一
ministration at the Budget Commi仕ee of仙e 134仇Diet session. Chief Judge D
made a judgment that the Daiwa Bank violated the U.S. law with the lack of
correct recognition of the rigidityof the U.S. law lYomiuri Online, 2000/9/20].
Individual shareholders filed shareholder representative suit against 49 officers
at the time for requesting the payment of about 1. 45 billion dollars (around
182. 7 billion yen). Consequently, shareholder representative and Daiwa Bank
came to a settlement at the Osaka High Court with the condition that the for一
mer members of the management should pay back total about 250 million yen
to the bank [Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2()01/12′/12].
In the judgment made by the Osaka High Court, it has been pointed out that
most of the directors and auditors in Japanese firms have been assigned within
the company, and they have not assumed the primary responsibilityof auditing
due to dependence in the inner circle. Taking this case as an opportunity,
audit functions have been reinforced ; for example, the auditor's term of of-
flCe has been prolonged from 3 to 4 years in Commercial Code. The way of exe-
cuting丘nancial administration by MinistIY Of Finance also became an issue.
The question was also raised as to whether it was appropriate to impose com-
pensation for loss on dir･ectors, which would be too expensive to pay. In sum-
malY, this issue has sparked debate regarding the securing of shareholders'
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rights and the scope of responsibility of directors. Eventually, this case was
ended with the "merger of Daiwa and Sumitomo" announced on November 4,
1995.
The Daiwa Bank case had a signi丘cant meaning in that (1) the question was
raised against the way of executing丘nancial administration by MinistⅣ of Fi-
nance, and it led to the disorganization of Ministry of Finance ; (2) it has
clar･ified that the Japanese firm's intemalcontrol system is weak, revealing
that Japanese flrmS are generally nervous about risks under their conventional
lifetime employment system, and check hnctions do not smoothly work ; and
furthermore, (3) it led to the criticism onthe "follow-everyone else" men-
talityin which no issue was raised or no responsibilitywas taken for the
bank's activities so long as other banks were doing the same thing. With this
case as a turning point, not only did Daiwa Bank itself cease operations after
that, but also Japan's country reputation as well as Japanese firms'Corporate
reputation sharply fell in the world business operation.
2. Huge I.oss involving Illegal Copper Trading by an Employee
Following the Daiwa Bank case, a氏er the collapse of the bubble economy in Ja-
pan, there was another case where the Japanese people were shocked and
their illusions about excellenりapanese丘rms were sha仕ered ; it was the illegal
copper trading by an employee (manager) of Sumitomo Corporation. Mitsubishi
Corporation, Sumitomo Corporation, and Mitsui & Co. Ltd. are major general
trading company (sogo sh()sha in Japanese) representing Japan, which have a
large number of talented employees. However, the former manager of Sumi-
tomo Corporatioll had conducted illegal copper trading and generated the huge
loss.When the case was disclosed in 1996, many Japanese people (not only in
Japan butalso particularly in the U.S. and England where the case occurred) were sur-
44　　会計学研究第32片
prised to know that the total amount of loss reached 285. 2 billion yen (around
2. 26 billon dollars).
The case was caused by the middle management who had continued flCtitious
copper trading for 10 years. According tothe Hanrei Times l1999] , the person
C was sentenced to 8 years in prison for forgeIY Of sealed private documents
and血･audulence related to copper trading.
How did Sumitomo Corporation react to the case? At the shareholders'meeting
held at Hotel New Otani on June 27, 1997, the company responded to share-
holders regarding the copper trading lSSue. The responses were roughly as fol-
lows (obtained by the website). Methods used in the illegal act included (1) off-
book borrowing, (2) allocation of accrued revenue, and (3)fictitious warrant
trading. ¶1e total amount of loss reached 285. 2 billion yen, and也e employee
was charged of forgery of private documents, fraudulence, etc. The company
has never allowed the act of the Manager C as conduct of the company. Ju-
thoughshareholder representative suit was filed against Sumitomo Corporation
for its accountabilityfor the loss generated throughmarket manipulation in the
U.S., the company rejected the claim. The company insisted that it has con-
ducted仙e appropriate inspection for compliance and provided appropriate
management system2, but the Manager C used a sophisticated method to slip
throughthe system. The company promised at the shareholders'meeting that
it would establish the Market Risk Management Office in the company.
2　According to the explanation of the judgment made by the Tokyo District Court,
the reason why the defendant was delivered a prison sentence of 8 years was be-
cause there were also quite large faults on山e Sumitomo Corporation side, such as
the lack of awareness of danger accompanying copperfutures trading and insuffi-
cient management system against the defendant (Hanrei Times l1999/1/15] ). How-
ever, it has denied the claim by Sumitomo Corporation.
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Correspondingly, Shareholder Ombudsman conducted a questionnaire suⅣey
among 500 individual shareholders (number of valid questionnaires mailed : 493 ; re-
sponse rate : 22%) randomly selected from the list of shareholders. Of those,
85% of respondents replied, "The failure of detection is inexcusable''; 77%,
``The management accountability is inescapable" ; and 66%, "The only remain-
ing way is a shareholder representative suit." Because there is a possibility of
the deviation among respondents, this result may not be totally reliable. How-
ever, it is apparent that many shareholders were dissatis丘ed with the response
by Sumitomo Corporation.
Hamakawa [1999] argued that if "the risk management was properly conducted
as self-admired by the former president Akiyama, it is inevitable that the com-
pany top management would be suspected of having been aware of the fact
while things were going on."
The author'S objective is not to evaluate which remark is correct. Documents
related to this case are not available in the Public Relations ()ffice of Sumitomo
Corporation. ne company stance is that the company only responds to our
questions. However, regarding the issue in which the company claimed that
"the management system (internal control system) was appropriate", the author
would like to introduce the well-known Heinrich's law so that readers can
make their own judgment.
Japanese excellent companies, such as Sumitomo Corporation wi仇histoⅣ and
strong brand, generally have the "complete:r internal control system in a tradi-
tional sense. Sumitomo Corporation is no exception. It is only natural for such
3 1n terms of accounting and operation auditing it may be perfect, but it does notin-
clude management audit, that is, corporate governance or compliance.
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flrmS, Which have a number of talented employees, to have the system. In addi-
tion, as responses to new circumstances, the author believes仇at the company
is making an effolt for compliance, as in the case of other firms. Many firms
are providing education and training as countermeasures against risks. jul of
the management officers, administrators, employees are supposed to make ef-
forts to ensure compliance, including training to new employees. Furthermore,
the internal control system has been enhanced′1. This way, it seems thattypical
Japanese companies are taking all possible measures for corporate governance
and compliance. Nevertheless, the senior management, who played a central
role in the company, failed to follow compliance. Furthermore, according to the
Heinrich's 1,aw, there are 29 minor accidents and 300 trifling accidents behind
the one serious accident. h the case of Sumitomo Corporation, it is true that
the illegal act was caused by one management, but the auditor cannot help feel-
ing that there could be more deep-rooted function trouble behind this case.
Why does the function trouble occur?Why is the compliance issue repeated?
Whether the company tries to completely cover up the case, or to improve仙e
awareness of employees by explaining the whole stoIY and making thorough
discussions so that similar compliance issues would never occur ; it all de-
pends on the decision of the top who assumes all responsibilities and authori-
ties, The largest issue in modern Japanese flrmS is that there is a corporate cul-
ture in which even talented employees keep silent and overlook law ethics, ille-
gal acts, and disadvantages. Such a corporate culture is likely to be developed
4　TTle PR office was willing to respond t() the questionnaire that the author sent
(2004/10/25)with four questions regarding compliance measures, etc., taken by the
company after the case. However, the author have not received the answer yet al-
thoughthe reminder wasalso sent two weeks after the questionnaire. Therefore, the
confir･mation has not been made regarding the case itself and the author Could not
identifyhow the company responded to the issue a托er the case. (to be omitted)
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in an organization with the lack of mobility of human resources, who think dif-
ferently from existing members of the organization (as can be generally seen in
Japanese traditional organizations). Particularly in Japanese organizations, it is the
best for self protection of employees to act as everyone else does, and many
employees try to stay inside the community.
Nine years have passed since the case occurred. Althougha shareholder repre-
sentative suit was filed against Sumitomo Corporation for the illegal copper
trading, a settlement has been already reached. After the case, Sumitomo Cor-
poration has achieved remarkable operating results due to the effect of thor-
ough restructuring and the proactive management. In the ``Top lnteⅣiew''
posted on the Sumitomo Corporation's website (ZOOS/12/15 ; Motoyuki Oka, Presi-
dent) , there have been reports regarding the process of restructuring con-
ducted after the copper trading case and the achievement of the record-high
profits in the interim account settlement for the flSCal year ended in September
2003. The company is also receiving favorable evaluations in terms of its corpo-
rate culture changes. The company lS prOaCtively challenglng new businesses
with the "acting quickly with the caution" management5. Furthermore, the
president Oka has been promoting the "aggressive management" for the last
two years, under the reason that "employee communication and teamwork are
important to takefull advantage of its strength as a generaltrade company." In
the fiscal year ended in March 20()5, consolidated net profits marked a record
high for the 2nd consecutive year.
As described above, the financial performance has obviously improved. From
the standpoint of the corporate reputation, we can understand that the illegal
5　Sumitomo Corporation was criticized in the past as the company that "makes no de-
eision even after thinking well" or "takes no action."
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Copper trading case did not have much signiflCant influence on the perform-
ance of Sumitomo Corporation (except actual losses). It suggests that unlike B to
C (Business to Consumer) flrmS, Such as the food industry that is directly linked
to consumers, there is a different aspect among B to B (Business to Business)
flrmS in terms of the influence of corporate reputation on flnanCial performance
(i.e., Corporate reputation does not have a signi丘cant influence on thefirm's financia一 per-
formance).
3. Payoffs to Corporate Racketeers (SohiyaG in Japanese) and "Wrong
Description" on Financial Statements
Payoffs to corporate racketeers have recently decreased, but they are still a
large risk factor to firms. In recent cases, we cannot avoid the issue of Seibu
Railway that violated the Commercial Code by providing funds to a corporate
racketeer throughthe disguised sale of property, and understated the number
of stocks owned by the company on丘nancial statements. The au仙Or would like
to take up the Seibu Railway case here to clarifywhy asset value owned by the
owner and commander of Seibu Railway and Seibu Group, who was reported as
the "richest man in the world" on the Forbes7 magazine in 1987, with the esti-
mated personal assets of21 billion dollars (3. 15 trillion yen at the time) , caused
the decline in corporate reputation, and what influence the case had on the
company and Japanese society.
Seibu Railway sold its property to a real estate company,for which a corporate
racketeer assumed the advisor, with total 245 million yen, which was lower than
6　Persons whothreaten company executives and demand money to them who do not
like to be a仕acked in general meeting of shareholders.
7　Current asset value owned by each person has been listed on "AERA"(2004/ll/1
issue).
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market value, and provided the corporate racketeer with total about 187 million
yen, the difference between resale margln and market value. Sixteen people (of
which one person was deceased)from Seibu Railway and the corporate racketeer
side were accused, and as of Fall 2004, Some people including a managing di-
rector were eonvicted8. me income concealment of 140 million yen was pointed
out by NationalTax Agency for the period of three years until the五scal year
ended in March 2003, and back taxes of approximately 50 million yen were coレ
Iected9.
In October 2004, a suⅣey started against Seibu Railway that understated the
shareholding ratio of major shareholders on丘nancial statements as well as
Kokudo that was the largest shareholder of Seibu Railway and sold stocks held
by it before the fact was disclosed. The shareholding ratio of the 10 largest
Seibu Railway shareholders was 88. 57% as of the end of March 2004, but was
understated as 63. 680/a onfinancial statements. According to the criteria for de-
1isting in the first and second sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the stock
name for which the shareholding ratio of the 10 largest shareholders and com-
pany executives exceed 80% of the total listed number of stocks shall be de-
listed when such a status continues more than one year. The former chairman
(CEO) of Kokudo resigned his position due to this issue川.
8　Newspapers, such as ′me Nihon Keizai, The Asahi and lne Yomiuri, all pub一ished
the report on October 1, 2004. me Nihon Keizai and The Asahi reported that the
number of people judged guiltywas 10 (as of August 2004) but Yomiuri reported
that the number was 14.
9　The starting point where the connection with the corporate racketeer was made has
been reportedindetail in the evening version of Yomiur･i Shimbun (2004/10/ll)
with the tit一e of "Payoff by Seibu Railway." However, the purpose of this study lies in
reputation risks, but not describe the corporate scandal itself.
10　Mr. Tsutsumi owned 36% of Kokudo stocks, and Kokudo owned 48.6% of Seibu
Railway stocks. Kokudo, which also controls Prince Hotels, a baseball team (Seibu
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In regard to the issue where Seibu Railway understated the shareholding ratio
of major shareholders, including Kokudo, on flnanCial statements, it turned out
that two CPAs who audit Seibu were independent, and moreover, One of them
had been successively handling auditing for 29 years. TTle revised Certified
Public Accountant I.aw, which was enforced in 2004, Specifies a rule requlrlng
accountant-in-charge changes every丘ve year (seven yearat Brst) So that the col-
lusion between the firm and the certifled public accountant can be prevented.
Independent accounting flrmSare exempted from the requirement, and there is
a monitoring system by the Japanese Institute of Certifled Public Accountants
(JICPA). However, from the standpoint of corporate governance, there are risks
in that (1) independent accountants may be more susceptible to the pressure
of the client when handling audit for largefirms and (2) there may be a
greater possibility of collusion between the accountant and the client company
when handling audit for a long period of timell. Furthermore, virtually every
auditors were relevant to the company they work for, and had continuously as-
sumed the position for more than 20 years.
Lions) ,etc., is an unlisted company that does not disclose financial information. It can
be said that the control of the Seibu group through the Kokudo led to opaque corpo-
rate cu一ture.
ll 1n the U.S., with the Enron case as the turnlng point, in order to eliminate Cozy re-
lationships between auditing丘rms and companies, the implementation of the Auditor
Change System alld establishment of the Listed Company Accounting Monitoring
Committee, which monitors accounting firms, were specifled in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (corporate reform law) enacted in July 2OO2. In Japan, with the Seibu case as a
tuming point, JICPA Chairman Tsuguoki Fujinuma stated lNihon Keizai Shimbun,
2004/10/22] as follows : ( 1) JICPA would provide guidance to independent account-
ants to in principle keep the term for maximum 7 years ; (2) 7 years would be appro-
priate for the term of accountant because Seibu is a public company ; and (3)
JICPA would provide guidance to independent accountants to gather and organize an
auditing corporation because independent accountants are susceptible.
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As described above, corporate govemance was not working properly in Seibu
Railway. TYle Series of cases resulted inthe sharp decline in the corporate
reputation of Seibu and signi丘cantly damaged its brand value. ¶le Series of
cases were probably caused by excessive optimism among management in血at
(1) other companies would have the similar relationship wi血company racket-
eers and (2日t would be allowable to continue the same thing because it had
been conducted for a long dme. However, in the dominant view of recent jour-
nals,the fundamental cause lied in the fact that (3) the same person had been
at the top of the company for so long,and there were no subordinates who
could speak丘･ankly tome top management.
The Seibu Railway stock was delistedfromthe Tokyo Stock Exchange on De-
cember 17, 2004 due to its understated description about stocks. According to
the Nihon Keizai Shimbun l2004/ll/6] ,the asset value (consolidated ; book
value) of Seibu Railway was 1. 1 trillion yen as of June 30, 2004. TYle number of
stocks held by Kokudo was 210 million as of血e end of September 2004.
When血e Seibu Railway stock price recorded仇e highest at 8, 000 yen in 1989
since its listing, the asset value, based on total market value, reached approxi一
mately 1. 7 trillion yen.When the stock price sharply fell due to the aftereffect
of the series of cases, includingthe false description on丘nancial statements,
the asset value dropped below 100 billion yen in November. Assuming that the
total market value as of November 6, 2004 was 100 billion yen befわre delisting,
the decreased portion of reputation assets due tothe series of cases would be
approximately i. 6 trillion yen as calculated below. Although this may be a
rough example丘･om the standpoint of血e accoun血g血eory12, me amount caL
12　The reasons includethefollowing : (1) The nuctuation of stock prices is large,
and thereare some objections to consideringthis as business value. (2) The market
value here was priced one week befわre delisting was decided, but血ere is a possibil-
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culated by subtracting the asset value血･om the total market stock value will be
called reputation assets.
Decreased portion of reputation assets = 100 billion yen - 1. 7 trillion yen
ニー1. 6trillion yen
Due to the decline in corporate reputation, the business value decreased by ap-
proximately 1. 6 trillion yenl･'i. The decreased portion can be defined as the de-
crease of corporate assets. If the accounting theory used in 1980 0r earlier was
used, it would be called the decrease of "goodwill," However,from the domi-
nant viewpoint in 1991 or later, it has been defined by some accounting re-
searchers as the decrease of "intellectual assets" [Edvinsson & Malone, 1997] ,
Further discussions would be required in the academic society as to whether
such a portion should be called仇e decrease of intellectual assets, or the de-
crease of reputation assets, but the author argues that it may be safely defined
as the decrease of "reputation assets" or increase of reputation liability, but
not the decrease of intellectual assts.
While the Seibu Group as a whole has total debts payable of approximately 1. 4
trillion yen, it is said that even today, where land prlCeS SlgniflCantly fell, it still
has the estimated unrealized pro丘ts of 1 trillion yen [Kamazuka et a1., 2004]. In
addition, there are a number of talented employees (human assets) in Seibu
Railway. There is totally no relationship between the drop of the stock price or
delisting and such sincere and talented employees. It also seems that there was
itythat market had already incorporated the factor of delistinginthe value.
13　There are views in which corporate value is considered as (1) total market stock
value,(2) eamings per share times stock, and (3) discounted cash flow into present
value.
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no misbehavior by the management to fill their pockets, as can be seen in the
Enroれ case discussed later.
Iwai [2004] has described that while top executives in the U.S. and Europe
tend to "rip off the company for their own profits," those involved in the
Japanese-type corporate governance tend to "identifythemselves with the com-
pany and privatize it.''Next case of Enron may support his argument. This
means that if the Seibu management, whi一e being free血･om various shackles in
the past, ensured the implementation of compliance in accordance with appro-
priate corporate governance, Seibu Railroad would be eligible for the greatly
admired company by the society in thefuture14.
Even today, there are a number of such excellent companies in Japan that still
have the outdated characteristic of corporate governance. It is hoped that the
management in such a company will make a serious e放)rt to improve corporate
governance by learning a lesson from Seibu Railway's case, endeavor to im-
prove corporate reputation, and contribute to the improvement of the "quality
of life" of valuable employees who work very diligentlyfor･ the firm. It is hoped
that Standard of Assessment and Audit of Internal Controls over Financial Re-
ports established by Financial SeⅣices Agency could reform these defects of
outdated Japanese companies described in this paper. It is because the Stan-
dard is based on COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
commission in 1992) which contributes much to enhance corporate governance
and compliance.
3,　What isthe Issue of the Failure ofEnron?
Many accounting related scandals and illegal actions of management, which
14 ln fact, bottom line of Seibu Railway has been increaslng for the last three years.
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have shaken up the American society, have occurred during the period from
2OOl to 20021T'. Until the Enron issue occurred, product safety and environ-
mental issues, etc. had been major issues in terms of corporate risk manage-
ment. However, corporate governance is now becomlng not Only ethical issues
but also the major theme of risk management. Corporate governance and com-
pliance have an in且uence on corporate reputation, reviewed with such cases as
the failure of Enron and false statement of financial reports by Seibu Railway
and other scandals.
1.Why Enron fell into Bankruptcy
ln仙e United States, Enron丘led for Chapter ll protection to the New York
Bankruptcy Court and fell into bankruptcy in December 2001. The amount of
total liabilities exceeded 40 billion dollars (approximately 5 tril一ion yen) , which re-
sulted in the largest bankruptcy in the U.S. history. Consequently, the assets of
Enron, which used to be 77 billion dollars, decreased to 500 million dollars. Ac-
cording to Neef l2003] , the failure of Enron had a worldwide impact beyond
仙e fact仙at an American company fell into bankmptcy, in the sense that仙e
U.S. corporate governance, such as stock investment, stock option, and trust of
accounting flrmS, Which had been considered to be absolute until then, col-
lapsed instantly.
Enron was the largest energy wholesaler in the world. juthoughthe same en-
ergy company handles power generation and distribution in Japan, the func-
tions of energy production (power generation) and sale (power distribution) have
been separated in the U.S. as a result of liberalization and deregulation in the
15　The largest case was the failure of Enron. WorldCom, Global Crossings, Tyco In-
ternational, A什hurAndersen, and among others, also went into bankruptcy.
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energy industⅣ since払e age of Reagan Administradon in the 1980 S. Enron
was established in 1985 as a gas pipeline company, but had grown to the giant
global company that generated sales of approximately 100 billion dollars ( ll tril-
lion yen) before its failul･e. Enron achieved growthby establishing a connection
with the neⅣe center of the U.S. Administration.
Why did the failure of Enron become such a major caseP According to the
dominant view, it is because the case resulted in the collapse of払e con丘dence
in (i) stock investment, (2) ultin1ate meritocracyand stock option, and (3)
accounting丘rms, which consequently led to the collapse of so･called American
"global standard," at which quite a few Japanese government staff, researchers,
and business executives at血e time were aiming.
First,the failure of Enron resulted in the collapse of the con丘dence in stockin-
vestment. Outside directors of Enron included personswith academic achieve-
mentand valuable insight such as notable Professor KrtlgmanOf Princeton Uni-
versibr. Enron Chairmanhy was the holder of Ph.D. in economics. Enron was,
in a common sense, me company wi血血e strongest corporate governance sys-
tem. Despite the fact, it was theinsider trading bythe Enron management in-
cluding ChairmanLay that led tothe loss of the con五dence in stock invest-
ment.When the Enron stock price dropped sharply in August 2001, the man-
agement sold the largeamount of stocks at a pro臥Then,the substitute chair-
man and丘nance director also sold their own stocks at a pro軌and it led to the
crash of the Enron stock price. Althoughthe Enron management could secure
meir own assets by selling their stocks at a pro丘t, me crash of me stock price
caused tremendous damage to general invcstoI･S and Enron employees. In par-
ticular, the employees who invested to Enron stocks in accordancewith 401 K,
which was newly implemented at the time, lost 90% of血eir pensions to be re-
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ceived after their retirement. For comparison. the annual income of Chairman
i.ay was approximately 18 billion yen at the exchange rate at the time, and Vice
ChairmanKisling earned the half of Chairman hy'S. Naturally, the Pension
Fund Association, which had been purchasing Enron stocks in high volume,
also suffered significant loss.
Second,from the aspect of management accounting, the complete meritocracy
had been conducted on a half-year performance evaluation basis lOshima and
Yajima, 2002] , which made possible to provide elite employees with rapidly
growing incentives血rough derivatives. In addition, there was the stock options
that stimulated such elite employees'ambitionl(). Enron had granted stock op-
tions to all employees for a long time. TTlis has been pointed out for a long
time, but stock options could be a big blow to the company in the recession pe-
riod when stock prices fall. In Japan, the New Business I.aw was partially re-
vised in October 1995, and丘rms were admi仕ed to implement stock options
only when they received certiflCation of the law by Ministry of International
Trade and lndustIY (current MinistlY Of Economy, Trade and Industry). Employees
can acquire capital gain by selling their company stocks when the company
goes public or the stock pnCe rises after the initial public stock offering. Stock
options can be utilized to motivate employees, and also for venture丘rms to re-
cruit talented human resources from large丘rms or research institutions. As
long as the stock price continues to rise, those whoinvolved in starting busi-
ness can build up enormous wealth17. However, when the stock price continues
16　According to the study by Oshima and Yajima [2002], Enron had granted stock
options for six years (from 1994 to 1999). Using stock options would enable the
owner to purchase the Enron stock with 50 dollars per share, even if the stock price
rose to 80 dollars half a year later.
17　Refer to Otsuka l2003] regarding the relationship between stock options and ac-
counting standards.
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to fall in the recession period, stock options cause significant damage to the
丘rm.
Third, the overstatement of pro丘ts conducted by Enron using transfer of losses
was based on aggressive accountinglH that was something on the borderline be-
tween legalityand illegality, and it could not be realized without cooperation of
an accounting丘rm. The accounting firm handling Enron was Arthur Andersen,
which at the time was well known in the world as one of the five biggest ac-
counting firms. The accounting representative at Aれhur Andersen shredded re-
lated documents just before the illegal act of Enron was disclosed. (The account-
ing firm claimed that the person shredded documents on his own authority.)
2. Result of EllrOn Failure
Arthur Andersen was one of the most reliable and notable accounting firms in
the world. The fact that such aglobal-scale accounting flr･m took part in the ille-
gal act suggested the possible presence of many other illegal accounting acts
behind the Enron case, and it was enoughto ruin the confidence in the U.S.
economic system. This case resulted in the decline in corporate reputation of
Author Andersen, which had a great number of certi丘ed public accountants at
the time, and it血ally ceased operations.
In addition to the above, Enroれ established multiple special purpose companies
(spc) that were the flCtitious entity, and reported a large amount of false prof-
its by selling assets to such SPCs. Furthermore, Enron commi仕ed a number of
activities that were on the borderline between legalityand illegality, such as
18　To unjustiflably create income statements, in order togiVe assurance to investors
and raise stock prices, is called "aggressive accounting," which is the relatively new
JOurnalism term.
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criminal acts in India, Bolivia, etc., utilization of tax havens]'J including the Cay-
man Islands, and tax avoidance.
¶le failure of Enron, World Com. AuthorAndersen accounting firm and others
leads to a new type of strict internal controls. That is, the American Upper/
IJOWer Chamber Conference summarizedthe "Proposal for Corporate Reform
IJaWS:'aimlng at the prevention of illegal acts by businesses, and the Sarbanes1
0Xley Act of 2002 was signed and legislated on July 30. The concept of山e Act
is based on COSO which emphasized on corporate governance and compliance
in addition to accounting and operating audit in internal controls. COSO also
contribute to the enhancement of corporate reputation.
Conclusion
ln　仙is paper, the author described some examples regarding corporate
reputation-related risk management, suggested specific measures taken by
flrmS, and, if required, provided points to keep ln mind. One of the aims is,
throughdiscussions in this paper, to clarifythat corporate reputation is caused
by the actions of top executives, managers, and employees. In this paper, the
focus was placed on issues regarding corporate governance and compliance.
Corporate governance and compliance are the most important issues in current
risk management of Japanese companies. There are two reasons why the En-
ron case has been taken up in this paper. One is because, as stated by Mr.
Greenspan, it was the case that made people realize the significance of corpo-
rate reputation lHannington, 20()4]. The WorldCom issue was the case where
19　A tax haven is a country that imposes no or low taxes, from the standpoint of over-
seas investors.
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the telecommunication carrier went into bankruptcy in July 2002 after the ac-
counting fraud on a massive scale and the dubious financing toward CEO were
disclosed. This case also tells us many lessons. However, the author would like
to take another opportunity to describe this subject. (the author would recommend
the Disconnected-Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom written by Jeter l2003] for readers
who are interested in this case.)
There is one more thing the author de丘nitely would like to point out ; it is
about the quick response taken by the U.S. Government and the Congress
against such scandals. TheAmerican Upper/IJOWer Chamber Conference sum-
marized the Proposal for Corporate Reform Acts, aiming at the prevention of il-
legal acts by businesses, and the Sarbanes-0Xley Act of 2002 was signed and
legislated on July 30. Althoughsome people criticizethat this new act is too se-
vere, it has been the largest-scale and comprehensive revision made for the last
5O years, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has created enforce-
ment rules that reinforce this new act.
The characteristic of Corporate governance lies in the relati()nship between
management and stakeholders. In the case of Seibu Railways, we can丘nd is-
sues frequently seen in Japanese丘rms, such as the unfavorable tie with corpo-
rate racketeers, false description on financial statements, and collusive link with
certified pubhc accountants. The Seibu Railway tells us how the actions of top
management violating corporate governance would have a significant influence
｡n corporate reputation. At the same time, we can find that, in Japan, as com-
pared with the U.S., although measures have been taken for individual issues,
there is no sufficient, visible, and fundamental resolution provided by the gov-
ernment. It seems to the author that modern corporate scalldals are not only
the issues for the Financial SeⅣices Agency or the Japan Institute of Certi丘ed
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Public Accountants, but the governmental issues that urgently requlre thefun-
damental resolutionZO. It was only 2005 when counterpart of COSO (Cohmittee
of Sponsoring Organizations of Treadway Commission) , Standard of Assessment and
Audit of Internal Controls over Financial Reports was issued from Financial
SeⅣice Agency in Japan.
With the Daiwa Bank huge loss case as the turning point, the "follow-everyone
else" mentalitywas criticized, the weakness in Japanesefirms'internal control
systems was disclosed, and it triggered血e debate about what corporate gov-
ernance should be (C. g., auditors'term of office and representative suit). In that
sense, the Daiwa Bank case provided a signiflCant meaning to the way Japa-
nese flrmS Should be. On the other hand, in the Sumitomo Corporation case,
not eveⅣthing has been resolved after the case. At present, Sumitomo Co叩Ora-
tion is reporting the record-highprofits in its hancial results. It suggests that
in B-to-B businesses, the decline in corporate reputation has a small influence
on flnanCial pellormance. In that sense, the Sumitomo Corporation case pro-
vided us valuable future study theme related to corporate reputation.
Regarding the Sumitomo Corporation case, the author happened to have a
chance to listen to the presentation by Mr. Noriaki Shimazaki, Director/Senior
Executive Officer of Sumitomo Corporation, and the author's questions have
been all cleared as to why the company achieved the record-high pro丘ts. ¶le
author would like to take this opportunity to brieny explain about changes
20　Some efforts have been made, including the revision of Commercial Codes, which
was enforced effective April 2002, based on the "proposed framework for･ revISlng the
commercial code regarding corporate governance" made in 1997 by the Liberal
Democratic Party LegalAffairs Sub-Committee regarding the revision of the com-
mercial code. However, legislation or creation of standards based on clear concepts
has not been achieved.
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made in the company. In fact, the author had not been able to obtain informa-
tion about Sumitomo Corporation until he met Mr. Shimazaki. Therefore, the
author had to conclude that it was B-to-BtyPe business, not internal reforms,
that became the reason why the decline in corporate reputation had a small in-
fluence on Sumitomo Corporation. However, after listening to the explanation
by Mr. Shimazaki, the author found out that his conclusion would not be ex-
actly correct.
At the 6 th breakfast meeting of the Best Practice Meeting Regarding CIO
Function and lmplementation, sponsored by the MinistIY Of Economy, Trade
and Industry,for which the author assumed a chair, Mr. Shimazaki presented a
report on January 20, 2005 regarding "Information system advancement and
management reforms at Sumitomo Corporation-CIOfunction and implementa-
tion." The author was able to obtain various new flndings there. Sumitomo Cor-
poration has implemented various management reforms ever since the illegal
copper trading case occurred. In addition to the implementation of risk man-
agement, the IT-related reforms included "Reform Package FY 99100," the pack-
aglng Of quantitative targets and specific measures ; "Step Up Plan FY-02," the
improvement of profitabilityand management efficiency throughthe expansion
of core businesses ; and the subsequent "AA Plan FY 03-04." As a result, the
360-degree evaluation system in which not only supeⅣisors evaluate their sub-
ordinates but subordinates also evaluate their supeⅣisors has been imple-
mented. Furthermore, in terms of the risk management issue for which the
president made a promise to shareholders eight years ago, the company has
developed the quantification system for risk assets21 , and has sufficientlyfu1-
21 Asset values are calculated (1) with risk returns according to type of business,
(2) with shareholder capital cost as 7. 5%, and by taking into consideration (3)
the growth potential and (4) the scale of business that is the abilityto make profits,
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丘lled its responsibility to shareholders. The internal control system has been
also steadily enhanced, and accordingly, in 2004, the company received the
Chairman Award from Japan Internal Audit Association where the author as-
sumes the role of the examiner of the award. Mr. Shimazaki, who seⅣes as the
Chair of Business Reform Promotion Committee in Japan, stated that he would
endeavor to further develop the internalControl system and enhance system
auditing in the ITrelated area.
In the U.S. and Europe, corporate executives very often utilize the company
"for their own pro丘ts." On the other hand, in Japan, corporate executives sacri-
fice themselves "for the company and try to conceal facts. The author believes††
that typical corporate executives and employees in Japanese丘rms have a sort
of "dignity" like Samurai in some aspects, as compared with corporate execu-
tives in the U.S. and Europe. However, in the modern societywhere media is
highly developed, the act of concealment should never be acceptable.
The author would like to let readers know that speci丘c examples of risk man-
agement are listed with actual corporate names because the author had a
strong desire to make readers understand the slgnificance and importance of
corporate reputation22. However, if it resulted in the significant damage of the
individual company's reputation, the author would like to apologize to the em-
ployees and their families. The author tried to make assurance double check,
but there may have been mistakes or inappropriate expressions. If there was
any such problems, the author would must sincerely apologlZe tO each of the
and are ranked from 1 st t0 120th.
22　The author considered hiding company names heI-C. HoweveI-, even if the names
were hidden, many readers would identifythe names, and I was concerned that hid-
1mg the names may glVe more negative impressions to readers.
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employees.
Lastly, the author would like to argue that many cases against corporate gov-
ernance and compliance could be avoided if internal control systems are com-
pletely introduced and practiced. The important thing is to face and appropri-
ately manage reputation risks, not avoid them.
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